Privacy Tools Guide

Bitcoin inheritance planning requires careful consideration of key custody, access recovery, and security thresholds. Casa, a multisig wallet provider, offers a collaborative custody model that distributes key ownership across multiple parties, eliminating single points of failure. This guide walks through setting up a Casa multisig configuration specifically designed for inheritance planning, with practical examples for developers and power users who prefer self-hosted solutions.

Understanding Collaborative Custody for Inheritance

Traditional Bitcoin storage relies on single private keys—a catastrophic failure point if the key holder becomes incapacitated or dies. Multisig (multisignature) wallets require multiple keys to authorize transactions, typically configured as M-of-N schemes where M keys out of N total keys must sign.

Casa’s collaborative custody model extends this concept by distributing keys across:

For inheritance scenarios, the configuration typically uses a 3-of-3 or 2-of-3 threshold, ensuring that no single party can access funds unilaterally while providing clear recovery paths for beneficiaries.

Prerequisites and Security Considerations

Before configuring your Casa multisig setup, ensure you meet these requirements:

For developers, Casa provides API access for programmatic key management. However, the web interface offers sufficient functionality for most inheritance planning use cases.

Step-by-Step Setup Process

1. Initialize Your Casa Account

Create an account through the Casa app or web interface. The signup process requires identity verification—this is a regulatory requirement and ensures Casa can execute recovery protocols legally.

# Verify your Casa app installation (iOS/Android)
casa-cli version
# Output: Casa v3.14.2

# Check connection status
casa-cli status
# Output: Connected to Casa API - Account: verified

2. Add Your Hardware Wallet

Casa supports Coldcard, Ledger, and Trezor devices. For maximum security, Coldcard is recommended due to its air-gapped operation and PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) workflow.

Connect your hardware wallet and initialize it through the Casa interface:

# For Coldcard users, export the extended public key via microSD
# Menu > Advanced > View Wallet > Export XPUB > AirGap

# Import into Casa (via web interface or CLI)
casa-cli wallet add-device --type coldcard --xpub "xpub..." --label "Primary Hardware Wallet"

3. Configure the Multisig Threshold

For inheritance planning, a 2-of-3 configuration provides the optimal balance:

This ensures that even if Casa ceases operations or you lose access to your primary key, your beneficiaries can recover funds using the personal backup key plus Casa’s backup under proper legal authorization.

4. Set Up Recovery Instructions

Casa allows you to define explicit recovery instructions that execute upon specific conditions. These instructions specify:

# Example recovery configuration structure (internal Casa format)
recovery_config:
  threshold: 2
  keys:
    - id: "primary_key"
      type: "hardware_wallet"
      location: "personal_safe"
    - id: "casa_backup"
      type: "custodial_backup"
      recovery_requirement: "legal_documentation"
    - id: "personal_backup"
      type: "beneficiary_key"
      beneficiary: "spouse"
  timelock:
    initial_delay_days: 30
    escalation_weeks: 4

5. Fund Your Multisig Wallet

Once configured, Casa provides a multisig receiving address. Send a small test transaction first (using testnet if possible) to verify the setup before transferring significant amounts.

# Generate a fresh receive address via Casa CLI
casa-cli wallet receive --account "inheritance_primary"
# Returns: bc1qxy2kgdygjrsqtzq2n0yrf2493p83kkfjhx0wlh

# Verify address matches your hardware wallet
casa-cli wallet verify-address "bc1qxy2kgdygjrsqtzq2n0yrf2493p83kkfjhx0wlh"
# Output: Address verified - Key participation: 3-of-3

Inheritance Execution Workflow

When the time comes to execute the inheritance, beneficiaries follow this process:

  1. Notification: Beneficiaries contact Casa with the account identifier and proof of death
  2. Documentation: Required legal documents are submitted (death certificate, will, identity verification)
  3. Key Activation: Casa activates the backup key recovery process
  4. Signing: Beneficiary signs with their hardware wallet plus Casa’s backup key
  5. Distribution: Bitcoin transfers to beneficiary-controlled addresses

The time lock feature provides an additional safeguard, preventing immediate distribution and allowing time for potential disputes or corrections.

Security Best Practices for Long-Term Storage

Beyond the Casa setup, implement these additional measures:

Alternative Approaches for Power Users

Developers may prefer completely non-custodial solutions. Consider combining Housebot with Specter-DIY for a fully self-hosted multisig setup:

# Specter-DIY multisig configuration example
# Access via Tor hidden service or air-gapped machine

{
  "wallet_type": "multisig",
  "threshold": 2,
  "keys": [
    {"source": "coldcard", "path": "m/48'/0'/0'/2'"},
    {"source": "trezor", "path": "m/48'/0'/0'/2'"},
    {"source": "ledger", "path": "m/48'/0'/0'/2'"}
  ],
  "policy": {
    "max_amount": 100000000,
    "time_lock": 2592000
  }
}

This approach eliminates third-party dependency but requires more technical expertise and manual key management.

Advanced Multisig Threshold Design

Choosing the right threshold (M-of-N) balances security with recoverability:

# Multisig threshold optimization for inheritance

class MultisigThresholdDesign:
    """Analyze trade-offs for different M-of-N configurations"""

    configurations = {
        '2-of-3': {
            'security_level': 'Medium',
            'recovery_difficulty': 'Easy',
            'single_point_failures': 1,
            'attack_requirement': 'Compromise 2 of 3 keys',
            'inheritance_use': 'Primary - you + Casa backup recovers funds',
            'risk': 'If you + Casa both compromised, attacker gets funds'
        },
        '3-of-3': {
            'security_level': 'High',
            'recovery_difficulty': 'Hard',
            'single_point_failures': 0,
            'attack_requirement': 'Compromise all 3 keys',
            'inheritance_use': 'Backup only - requires all parties to sign',
            'risk': 'If any key lost, funds unrecoverable'
        },
        '3-of-5': {
            'security_level': 'Very High',
            'recovery_difficulty': 'Medium',
            'single_point_failures': 2,
            'attack_requirement': 'Compromise 3 of 5 keys',
            'inheritance_use': 'Complex family structures - spouse + 3 adult children',
            'risk': 'Requires coordination from multiple parties'
        },
        '2-of-5': {
            'security_level': 'High',
            'recovery_difficulty': 'Easy',
            'single_point_failures': 3,
            'attack_requirement': 'Compromise 2 of 5 keys',
            'inheritance_use': 'Maximum accessibility - any 2 beneficiaries can recover',
            'risk': 'Only 2 keys needed for theft'
        }
    }

    def recommend_threshold(self, context: str) -> str:
        """Recommend based on threat model"""

        if context == "individual_high_security":
            return "2-of-3: Maximum security with simple recovery"
        elif context == "family_inheritance":
            return "3-of-5: Distribute across family members, any 3 can recover"
        elif context == "business_cofounders":
            return "2-of-3: Founder A, Founder B, Trusted Advisor"
        elif context == "maximum_redundancy":
            return "3-of-5: Any 3 of (primary, backup1, backup2, trusted, escrow)"

Timelocks and Escrow Mechanics

Prevent immediate loss if keys are stolen by implementing recovery delays:

# Bitcoin Core multisig with timelock protection

# Setup: 2-of-3 multisig requiring 2 signatures
# + 1-of-3 timelock requiring 1 signature after 90 days
# This prevents attacker from immediately spending if they get 2 keys

# Generate keys
key1=$(bitcoin-cli -regtest getnewaddress)
key2=$(bitcoin-cli -regtest getnewaddress)
key3=$(bitcoin-cli -regtest getnewaddress)

# Create 2-of-3 multisig address
multisig=$(bitcoin-cli -regtest createmultisig 2 "[\"$key1\", \"$key2\", \"$key3\"]")
address=$(echo $multisig | jq -r '.address')

# Send funds to multisig
txid=$(bitcoin-cli -regtest sendtoaddress $address 1.0)

# Later, need 2 signatures to spend. If attacker has 2 keys:
# - Immediate spend possible with any 2 keys
# - Timelock prevents this IF configured with OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY

# Advanced: Create spending transaction with timelock
# (Requires PSBT and compatible hardware wallets)
psbt=$(bitcoin-cli -regtest walletcreatefundedpsbt \
  "[{\"txid\":\"$txid\",\"vout\":0}]" \
  "[{\"$beneficiary_address\":0.99}]" \
  0 \
  '{"changeAddress":"'$change_address'"}')

# Attach timelock: 90 days = 7776000 seconds
# Beneficiary can only spend after 90 days pass
bitcoin-cli -regtest finalizepsbt $psbt

Ensure beneficiaries understand the process:

# Inheritance execution checklist document

inheritance_plan = {
    'document_name': 'Bitcoin Inheritance Plan - Legal Execution',
    'created_date': '2026-03-21',
    'review_date': '2027-03-21',
    'beneficiaries': [
        {
            'name': 'Primary Spouse',
            'role': 'Primary beneficiary - receives all Bitcoin',
            'key_location': 'Safe deposit box - Bank of [City]',
            'instructions': [
                '1. Obtain copy of death certificate',
                '2. Contact Casa with death certificate + will',
                '3. Provide own hardware wallet or Casa will direct you',
                '4. Initiate recovery with Casa + your backup key',
                '5. Wait 30-day recovery window',
                '6. Bitcoin will be available in your wallet'
            ]
        }
    ],
    'contacts': [
        {
            'role': 'Estate Attorney',
            'name': 'John Doe, Esq.',
            'phone': '+1-555-0123',
            'email': 'john@lawfirm.com',
            'note': 'Has copy of will and this document'
        },
        {
            'role': 'Casa Support',
            'website': 'casa.io/support',
            'note': 'They will guide recovery with legal docs'
        }
    ],
    'security_locations': [
        {
            'location': 'Safe Deposit Box - Bank of Chicago',
            'contents': 'Backup key, this document, password list',
            'access_by': 'Spouse + executor',
            'access_procedure': 'Bring death certificate to bank'
        },
        {
            'location': 'Attorney Safe',
            'contents': 'Copy of this document, will',
            'access_by': 'Estate executor',
            'access_procedure': 'Executor contacts attorney'
        }
    ]
}

Common Inheritance Mistakes to Avoid

# Anti-patterns in Bitcoin inheritance

mistakes = {
    'single_point_failure': {
        'description': 'Storing only one recovery key',
        'consequence': 'If that key is lost/destroyed, Bitcoin unrecoverable',
        'correct': 'Distribute keys across multiple locations + people'
    },
    'unclear_beneficiary_access': {
        'description': 'Beneficiary doesn\'t understand multisig recovery',
        'consequence': 'Beneficiary can\'t access funds even with keys',
        'correct': 'Include step-by-step written instructions + practice drills'
    },
    'inadequate_legal_documentation': {
        'description': 'No will mentioning Bitcoin',
        'consequence': 'Inheritance goes to government, not family',
        'correct': 'Update will, mention specific Bitcoin holdings, name executor'
    },
    'unused_timelock': {
        'description': 'No delay before funds are spendable',
        'consequence': 'If keys compromised, attacker spends immediately',
        'correct': 'Use timelocks (90-180 days) for recovery delay'
    },
    'password_lock_only': {
        'description': 'Protecting hardware wallet with only a PIN',
        'consequence': 'Attacker with physical access can brute force',
        'correct': 'Use passphrase + multisig (separate from PIN)'
    },
    'no_regular_testing': {
        'description': 'Never verifying recovery actually works',
        'consequence': 'Recovery fails when needed',
        'correct': 'Test recovery annually on testnet'
    }
}

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