Privacy Tools Guide

Protect election observer witness testimony using Signal for encrypted communications, exiftool to strip GPS from photos, encrypted storage containers (VeraCrypt) for case notes, and Tor for communications. Never store unencrypted witness identities with evidence, and use separate devices for different operations to compartmentalize data.

Understanding the Threat Model

Election observers operate in hostile environments where data breaches can endanger witnesses and invalidate evidence. Your threat model typically includes:

Every piece of data—from a timestamp on a photo to a phone number in a call log—can compromise a witness. The solution requires defense in depth across collection, storage, and transmission.

Secure Data Collection

Camera and Photo Protection

When capturing evidence, disable location metadata before sharing:

# Using exiftool to strip GPS data
exiftool -gps:all= -overwrite_original evidence_photo.jpg

# Batch processing a directory
exiftool -gps:all= -overwrite_original ./evidence/

For mobile devices, use camera apps that disable metadata by default. On Android, Camera FV-5 allows configurable metadata handling. On iOS, Shortcuts can automate metadata stripping:

Take Photo
    → Adjust Brightness (optional)
    → Remove GPS from Image
    → Save to Files (encrypted container)

Secure Note-Taking

Avoid cloud-synced notes. Use locally-encrypted solutions like Obsidian with the encrypted notes plugin, or SafeNotes for simple encrypted text. For structured testimony, consider:

Encryption Fundamentals

File-Level Encryption

For protecting testimony documents before storage or transmission:

# Using age (modern, simple encryption)
age-keygen -o key.txt
age -p -i key.txt -o testimony.encrypted.txt testimony.txt

# Using GPG for compatibility
gpg --symmetric --cipher-algo AES256 testimony.txt

The age tool provides cleaner syntax and faster operation than GPG for daily use. Store the key separately from the encrypted file—ideally on a hardware security key or memorized passphrase.

Database Encryption

When building testimony management systems:

# Using SQLCipher for encrypted SQLite
from sqlcipher import connect

conn = connect('testimony.db')
conn.execute("PRAGMA key = 'your-256-bit-key-here'")

# All data now encrypted at rest
cursor.execute("INSERT INTO witnesses VALUES (?, ?)", (name, encrypted_testimony))

This ensures that if devices are seized, the database remains unreadable without the key.

Secure Communication Channels

End-to-End Encrypted Messaging

For coordinating with witnesses:

Tool Metadata Protection Self-Destruct Notes
Signal Good Yes Phone number required
Session Excellent Yes No phone number
Briar Excellent No Requires proximity or Tor
SimpleX Excellent Yes No identifiers

Signal remains the most accessible option, but for high-risk contacts, Session or Briar provide better metadata protection.

Secure File Transfer

Avoid email attachments. Use:

For one-time transfers:

# Using OnionShare
onionshare --verbose --persistent testimony.encrypted.txt

# Using magic-wormhole
wormhole send testimony.encrypted.txt

Both provide link-based sharing with end-to-end encryption.

Network Operational Security

Tor Browser Configuration

When accessing sensitive information:

// In Tor Browser about:config
privacy.resistFingerprinting = true
network.cookie.cookieBehavior = 1
javascript.options.enabled = false  // if possible

Enable the Safest security level for maximum protection, understanding that some sites may become unusable.

VPN Selection

For observers in the field, VPN selection requires careful consideration:

Avoid VPN services based in Five Eyes jurisdictions if local laws permit.

Device Security

Air-Gapped Storage

For long-term evidence preservation:

# Create encrypted volume on air-gapped machine
cryptsetup luksFormat /dev/sdX

# Mount with separate key file on USB
cryptsetup luksOpen /dev/sdX evidence --key-file=/mnt/usb/keyfile

Store the USB key separately from the device. Use a dedicated machine for sensitive evidence that never connects to the internet.

Mobile Device Hardening

For field phones:

  1. Enable full disk encryption
  2. Use a PIN longer than 6 digits
  3. Disable biometric unlock for sensitive apps
  4. Install apps only from verified sources
  5. Use secondary “burner” devices for high-risk contacts

Consider GrapheneOS or CalyxOS for degoogled Android with improved security models.

Metadata Considerations

Every digital action leaves traces. Understanding what leaks:

Combat this through:

Incident Response

Have a plan for device compromise:

  1. Remote wipe capability: Find My Device, Cerberus, or hardware kill switches
  2. Dead man switches: Automated data deletion if you don’t check in
  3. Encrypted backups: Stored separately from primary evidence
  4. Contact protocols: Pre-arranged check-ins with trusted parties
# Example: Scheduled auto-deletion script (run from cron)
#!/bin/bash
if ! ping -c 1 -W 5 emergency-contact.example.com; then
    shred -u /home/observer/evidence/*
    rm -rf /home/observer/.cache/*
fi

Building Custom Solutions

For organizations needing custom tooling:

# Python example: Encrypted testimony storage
from cryptography.fernet import Fernet
import hashlib
import json

class SecureTestimonyStore:
    def __init__(self, password: str):
        key = hashlib.sha256(password.encode()).digest()
        self.cipher = Fernet(key)

    def store(self, witness_id: str, testimony: str) -> str:
        data = json.dumps({
            "witness": witness_id,
            "content": testimony
        }).encode()

        encrypted = self.cipher.encrypt(data)
        return encrypted.hex()

    def retrieve(self, encrypted_hex: str) -> dict:
        encrypted = bytes.fromhex(encrypted_hex)
        data = self.cipher.decrypt(encrypted)
        return json.loads(data)

This provides application-level encryption independent of disk encryption.

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